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This paper analyzes the rationale of airport business models. 
First, it provides evidence that the airports should be considered 
as two sided markets because of significant network externalities 
between the airlines and the passengers. This result invalidates 
the traditional approach where the airport-airline-passenger 
relationship is considered as vertically integrated, taking 
passengers as final consumers. Second, a testing procedure 
aimed at eliciting the real business model of airports 
demonstrates that the major U.S. airports do not internalize the 
externalities existing between airlines and passengers. We find 
that these airports set profit maximizing prices for the 
non-aeronautical services to passengers and Ramsey prices for 
the aeronautical services to airlines. Given these results, we 
conduct a welfare analysis by simulating the implementation of 
profit maximizing prices when an airport fully accounts for the 
two-sidedness of its activities. In particular, we show that the 
impact on social welfare is not independent on the specific 
features of each airport and that the privatization of airports 
cannot be considered as the only solution for airports. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In many countries, airports are under increasing pressure to become 
financially self-sufficient and less reliant on government support for at least two 
reasons. First, airlines, which face a fierce price competition since the 
liberalization in the air transport industry, seek to lower their operating costs 
that comprise landing fees and other costs linked to the aeronautical services. 
Second, the air traffic experiences a strong and sustainable growth that fosters 
the degree of congestion of airports and airspace, which in turn triggers delays 
and, as a consequence, involves further costs for airlines and for passengers. 
(See Graham, 2009.) 
Traditionally airports have been viewed as public service providers to 
airlines, and as such, have always been owned, managed or regulated by public 
authorities. Mainly based on the argument that public airports have not been 
able to rise to the challenge the increase in the air traffic and the need for 
efficient solutions to larger congestion costs and travel delays, a major 
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movement has been initiated towards a higher involvement of the private sector 
in the operation of airports, as in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada which have been pioneers in the process of airport privatization. In 
the United States and in many European countries, the debate on the 
privatization of airports remains high on the agenda.
1
 
In this context, our objective is here to contribute to the design of 
efficient business models of airport management and to the debate on 
privatization of airports. Specifically, this paper is aimed at deciphering the 
economic behavior of airport managers, that is to say, at identifying their 
pricing rules and testing how they account for the interdependency of their 
clients, passengers and airlines. For this purpose, it is crucial to base the 
analysis on a correct model of airport behavior. 
Nowadays airports are considered as complex infrastructure providing 
various services, both aeronautical and non-aeronautical, to airlines and 
passengers. Although the aeronautical activities belong to the original mission 
of airports, airports generate a significant amount of revenue from passengers 
through non-aeronautical activities.
2
 It is well understood that there is an 
interdependence between airlines and passengers: Airlines prefer to operate at 
airports which are attractive to passengers and passengers enjoy airports where 
they can access more air links and destinations, as well as a wide range of shops 
and restaurants, and convenient parking and transportation facilities.  
Based on this description, our conjecture is that airports can be 
considered as two-sided markets or platforms. Following the seminal article by 
Rochet and Tirole (2002) and subsequent articles by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 
2006) and Armstrong (2006), Weyl (2010) and Filistrucchi et al. (2012) state 
that two-sided platforms have three main features. First, they are multi-product 
firms which serve distinct products to each side. Secondly, users’ benefits on 
one side of the platform depend on how well the latter performs on the other 
side. Finally, platforms are price setters on both sides. It is straightforward to 
observe that airports satisfy these three conditions, and consequently should be 
treated as two-sided platforms. Indeed, airports serve two distinct groups of 
users: passengers and airlines. On one side, passengers use non-aeronautical 
services of airports such as parking, shops and restaurants as well as its 
aeronautical services to travel. On the other side, airlines use aeronautical 
services of airports such as landing and take-off facilities, or check-in areas. 
Airports negotiate prices with the airlines and charges them for the use of the 
aeronautical facilities at the airport and they charge the passengers via the prices 
of non-aeronautical facilities provided by the airport. In addition, the benefits of 
each side depend on the number of agents on the other side: An airport is more 
valuable to airlines if it is popular with the passengers, and passengers value the 
airport more when they can find a flight scheduled closer to their desired 
departure time or which is better in saving their travel time.  
                                                 
1
 See Gillen (2009) for a discussion on the ownership structure of airports. 
2
 In 2014, airport and ancillary fees represented a revenue of €1251 million for Aéroport de Paris while retail, car 
parks and other services have amounted to €705 million. 
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Already Gillen (2009) has suggested that airports could be considered as 
two-sided platforms after pointing out the increasing importance of commercial 
revenues of airports. In a companion piece, we have also provided some 
empirical evidence on the two-sidedness of airports using data on U.S. airports. 
(See Ivaldi et al., 2012.) Here, we exhibit the structural ingredients of this 
two-sidedness and we take one step further by identifying the pricing strategies 
of airports using this two-sided market setting and by providing an estimate of 
welfare gains obtained by using a business model that fully recognized this 
economic structure of airports. 
With this approach in mind, we consider an airport as a monopoly 
platform, and, in this setup, we derive the passengers’ demand for air transport 
services by means of a logit-type specification and the airlines’ pricing behavior 
under Bertrand competition. We then fit the whole model to a panel dataset of 
U.S. airports. The estimation confirms the significance of externality effects 
between the two sides of the market. We then attempt to uncover the airports’ 
business models. Using our data on U.S. airports, we compare three pricing 
schemes under either a two-sided or a one-sided structure: Pigouvian, profit 
maximization and Ramsey pricing. To do so, we apply a test statistic 
implemented by means of a bootstrap method in order to identify the pricing 
behavior of airports that is the best approximation of the data generating 
process. 
Our first conclusion states that, without any doubt, airports should be 
considered as two sided platforms. As such this paper is the first extensive 
empirical analysis of airports within the literature on the two-sided markets.
3
 
Furthermore, as a result of our testing procedure to detect the real business 
model of airports, we demonstrate two main facts. First, the airports in our data 
set do not account for the two-sidedness of their activity when deciding on the 
prices charged to passengers and airlines. In other words, they do not internalize 
the externalities existing between two sides. Second, they use different pricing 
schemes for each side. More precisely, we find empirical evidence of profit 
maximizing prices for passengers and Ramsey prices for airlines. Given this 
conclusion, we simulate the case where the monopolist profit maximizing 
airport is setting the prices under a two-sided market structure. We compute the 
social welfare under this scenario and compare it with the actual social welfare. 
We find that the results are airport dependent: For some airports this 
hypothetical pricing would increase the welfare while for others it would not. 
Our paper differs from previous studies that look at the question of 
airport pricing from a theoretical point of view as in Basso (2008) and Basso 
and Zhang (2008) or from an empirical angle as in Gagnepain and Marin (2005, 
2006), who consider the airport-airline-passenger relationship to be vertically 
integrated, taking passengers as final consumers. In these articles, the demand 
for airport services appears as a derived demand which comes from the 
                                                 
3
 The empirical literature on two-sided markets is mainly focused on the media industry. See Kaiser and Wright 
(2006), Argentesi and Ivaldi (2007), Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) and Sokullu (2012). 
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necessity of the product of airlines (air transport demand) so that they consider 
airlines as intermediaries. It is then not surprising that we differ in our 
evaluation of the sources of sub-optimality of airport pricing. 
Our paper also contributes to an important debate on different regulatory 
pricing policies, the so-called single-till or dual-till, applied to airports. In the 
single till approach, a price-cap formula includes revenues derived from both 
aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities while, in the dual till approach, 
only the revenues from aeronautical activities are taken into account. The 
advocates of the dual till system claim that regulation should concentrate on 
activities which are characterized by a natural monopoly; thus revenues from 
commercial activities should not be included in the formula. (See Beesly, 
1999.) Several articles deal with these two systems. Starkie and Yarrow (2009) 
point out the strong complementary between the aeronautical and 
non-aeronautical activities. Zhang and Zhang (2010) study the airport’s 
decision on pricing and capacity both under the single-till and the dual-till 
approach and conclude that it will over-invest in capacity under both single-till 
and dual-till regulation. Currier (2008) looks at a price cap regulation of airports 
and proposes a price capping scheme which yields Pareto improvements 
compared to the status-quo regardless of single-till or dual-till regulation. 
Czerny (2006) points out that single-till regulation is more welfare enhancing at 
non-congested airports than dual-till. Here we do not investigate the impact of 
these regulations. However, by demonstrating the two-sidedness of airports and 
by identifying the true business model of airports under an appropriate 
economic structure, our paper provides key evidence for the design of an 
efficient pricing methodology. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
provides a descriptive analysis. Section 3 explains the passengers’ and airlines’ 
behavior. Section 4 introduces the airport pricing schemes. Section 5 presents 
the empirical specification and estimation results. Section 6 describes the 
airport pricing and simulation results. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.  
 
II. Data 
 
Our data are drawn from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey 
(DB1B) and DOT 100 Domestic Segment (T100 databases) provided by the 
U.S. Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS), and from Airport Data published by 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Moreover, some of the airport 
characteristics, such as the number of parking lots and the number of concession 
contracts, have been gathered directly from the airports. The DB1B survey 
comprises a 10% sample of airline tickets from the U.S. reporting carriers and 
gives detailed information on ticket fares, itinerary (origin, destination, and all 
connecting airports), the ticketing and operating carrier(s) for each segment, 
and the number of passengers travelling on the route at a given fare. The T100 
Marc Ivaldı, Senay Sokullu and Tuba Toru 
- 5 - 
databases provide the frequency of flights for all routes in the U.S. Airport Data 
combined with the information gathered directly from airports informs us on the 
aeronautical and commercial operations of airports as well as the facilities. To 
construct our working sample, we extracted from DB1B and T100 the records 
corresponding to the third quarter of 2006 during which, for the first time since 
2000, the U.S. airline industry experienced a positive aggregate net profit, more 
precisely, 3.04 billion USD excluding restructuring and bankruptcy costs. (See 
ATA, 2012.) The final working dataset satisfies the following constraints. 
First, in our empirical model below, we define a product as an 
airline-itinerary combination, i.e., a route between an origin and a destination 
performed by an airline. After combining the different data sources, we 
consider the products with the following characteristics. First, we only hold 
round trip itineraries within the U.S. territory, thus avoiding any issues that may 
arise from international flights because of differences amongst countries. Note 
that, as the U.S. is geographically large, we can still profit from the large 
heterogeneity among the destination-specific features, such as miles flown and 
destination population. Moreover considering only round trips eliminates any 
effect that may stem from nonlinear pricing of single tickets. Then the market is 
defined as a directional pair of an origin and a destination airport. This allows us 
to capture not only the origin airport and city characteristics but also the 
destination city characteristics in passenger demand, thus preventing any 
possible omitted variable bias that might be related to destination city.  
Second, in our model, we also assume that each airport is a monopoly, 
i.e., there are no competitors.  Thus we need to select airports that can be 
considered as monopolies. To do so, we restrict attention to flights originating 
from the main U.S. hub airports. These hubs are more likely to be in a monopoly 
position since they are much larger and offer more facilities to airlines and 
passengers. In addition, as hub airports are busier than other airports, they may 
allow us to capture congestion effects better.
4
 Table 1 provides the list of 
                                                 
4 Restricting attention to the main U.S. hub airports in order to support the monopoly assumption is worth to be 
discussed in more details. Two main issues can be raised against this choice. First, one may argue that the airports in our 
sample have competitors. For example, JFK would be possibly competing with La Guardia and Newark. Second, since 
the airports in our sample are hubs, it may also be the case that they are in competition with each other. For instance, 
someone who wants to fly from New York to Los Angeles can do it either via Atlanta or via Chicago, which makes 
Atlanta and Chicago competitors.  
Regarding the first point, since Atlanta, Minneapolis and Salt Lake City airports, which belongs to our list of 
selected airports, are alone in their metropolitan area, they do not have competitors. For Chicago, Houston and New 
York City, there is more than one airport in their metropolitan area. However, they are all managed by the same local 
port authority. In that case, they are cooperating and sharing the market, which is compatible with our monopoly airport 
assumption. Concerning, Baltimore International and Dulles International which serve the same metropolitan area and 
are owned by two different local port authorities, we observe that, in our final data, there are five routes which originate 
from both of these airports and only three of them are served by the same airline. Hence we believe that the monopoly 
assumption should not have significant effects on our results. Finally, there are three airports in San Francisco Bay Area 
and we only have San Francisco International in our sample. Given the FAA ranking and the total number of 
destinations at each airport, it is clear that the scales of these airports are very different from each other and for most of 
the routes, San Francisco International is a monopoly.  
Regarding the second issue that can be raised, i.e., hub airports are in competition with each other, even if it 
is the case, it should not cause a bias in our analysis, since we consider direct flights only. Note that, when we select the 
data for the nine hubs from the DB1B database, 63% of observations are direct flights. Hence, selecting direct flights 
and considering that hub airports are de facto two complementary ingredients of  the monopoly assumption. 
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selected airports that also results from a practical reason. Although Airport Data 
of FAA provides information such as financial statements, land area, distance 
the closest business district, it does not have information on the number of 
parking lots and number of concessions. To obtain concession and parking data 
we directly contacted the thirty-one largest hub airports and the needed 
information was provided by nine hubs that constitutes our dataset. Note 
however that the total number of passengers using these nine hub airports 
represents 42.1% of the total passenger traffic of the thirty-one largest U.S. 
main airports.  
Third, since the passengers are likely to consider the characteristics of 
connecting airports when they buy their tickets, data on airports are needed. 
Albeit we had the connecting flights and connecting airports in the dataset, 
much information about the connecting airports (concession and parking) and 
connection such as layover time were missing. Hence we focus on direct flights 
only.
5
 Besides direct flights, we eliminate code shared products by keeping the 
direct flights with single ticketing and operating carriers. In the code-shared 
flights, the passenger’s decision may also be affected by the code-sharing 
partner, thus exclusion of this information may cause an endogeneity problem. 
By considering the observations with single ticketing and operating carriers we 
reduce the effect of this endogeneity. At last, we select markets which are 
served by at least two competing carriers in order to be consistent with the 
assumption of competition among airlines on the same markets that we consider 
in our model. Among the direct flights in our sample, since the share on 
monopoly markets was around 20% of the data, we did not lose many 
observations by applying this selection.   
Finally, we use demographic data obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau in order to control for market characteristics. Population and median per 
capita personal income in the metropolitan area where the airports are located 
are included in the list of demographic variables. The market size is measured 
by the population in the metropolitan area where the origin airport is located.  
The resulting sample used in our estimation has 377 products 
(airline-itinerary combination), covers 165 markets (origin-destination) and 9 
origin airports. The complete list of airlines and the total number of itinerary 
can be found in Table 2. United Airlines, Delta Airlines and American Airlines 
are respectively associated with 72, 70 and 56 itineraries which make around 
52.2% of the all observations in our data. As shown in Table 3, the airports in 
our sample generate, on average, 40% of their revenue from non-aeronautical 
activities, the rest coming from aeronautical activities. Note however the large 
share of non-aeronautical revenues for Atlanta. The reason for the large share of 
non-aeronautical revenue stems from the fact that aeronautical revenues of 
Atlanta is very low compared to similar size airports in our data such as Chicago 
and George Bush airports. For instance, aeronautical revenue of Chicago airport 
                                                 
5
 Note that selection of direct flights only may cause a potential selection bias if the idiosyncratic demand shocks are 
correlated with the choice of direct versus connected flights. Hence, in the model we will assume that a passenger 
chooses between the airlines given her choice of direct route. 
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is $340.2 million whereas its non-aeronautical revenue is $155.2 million in 
2006. When we look at the same figures for Atlanta airport, although it has $158 
million non-aeronautical revenue, its aeronautical revenue is only $53.1 
million. ATRS Global Airport Benchmarking Report shows that Atlanta has the 
lowest landing fee among the North American airports which is explained by 
Atlanta airport’s high efficiency due to its outsourcing strategy. (See ATRS, 
2006.)  
For each airline-itinerary combination (that we define as a product), 
there is a set of data that are distinguished by the prices paid and the number of 
passengers paying each of those prices. Therefore, we transform them by taking 
the weighted average of prices and we aggregate the number of passengers 
purchasing the same product. To each product, it is then associated one price 
and one volume of passengers. 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of our main variables. The overall 
average ticket fare (i.e., the price of a product) is $97.85 and an airline carries on 
average 2174 passengers in an origin-destination per quarter. The mean number 
of flights operated by an airline in an origin-destination is 401 and the average 
number of flights originated from an airport is around 70 thousand. Considering 
airport related variables, the average number of destinations originated form an 
airport is 20 and the average landing fee is $311 per aircraft.  
 
III. Modelling Passenger and Airline Behavior 
 
In this section, we present our model of passenger and airline behavior. 
First, we derive the transport demand equation for passengers, then the pricing 
and frequency equations that define the airlines’ strategies.  
 
A. Passenger Side 
 
A passenger 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼, has to decide between travelling to a given 
destination airport 𝑑 , 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷 , from an origin airport 𝑜  and “not 
travelling” or “using other transport modes” which is her outside option referred 
by the index 0. Under the option of travelling by air, the passenger has to 
choose an airline 𝑗 among the set of available airlines 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝑜𝑑  for the 
given origin-destination 𝑜𝑑, and 𝐽𝑜𝑑 is the total number of airlines operating 
from origin airport 𝑜  to destination airport 𝑑 . Moreover, each passenger 
consumes a positive amount of commercial good at the airport while non-fliers 
cannot consume any. To represent the behavior of passengers, we adopt a 
nested logit model.
6
 The indirect utility level achieved by passenger i  from 
choosing airline 𝑗 for the given origin-destination, 𝑜𝑑, is:  
                                                 
6
 Note that, including first the choice of using an airport or not using it, allows us to extend the model to competing 
platforms easily. Indeed, to do so, one can introduce the competing airports to the first nest of the choice tree. 
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(1)  𝑈𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑗 + 𝜀𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖  
where 𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑗  is the mean utility level of using airline 𝑗 at 𝑜𝑑 and 𝜀𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖  is a 
consumer specific unobservable effect. We specify 𝜀𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖  as follows:  
(2)  𝜀𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖 = 𝜈𝑜𝑑
𝑖 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜈𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖     ∀𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 
The error term 𝜈𝑜𝑑
𝑖  captures passenger 𝑖’s preference for travelling by air, and 
𝜈𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖
 
captures passenger preference for a specific airline operating at 𝑜𝑑. We 
assume that 𝜈𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖  is distributed Type I Extreme Value and 𝜈𝑜𝑑
𝑖  is distributed 
such that 𝜀𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑖  is also distributed Type I Extreme Value. Under this 
specification, the parameter 𝜎  shows the within group correlation of 
unobserved utility and it is restricted to lie between 0 and 1. In other words, 𝜎 
is the substitutability of airlines operating in 𝑜𝑑. Note that, higher 𝜎 means 
greater substitutability across airlines and more intense competition.  
The mean utility level of using airline 𝑗, 𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑗 is specified as:  
(3)  𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑗 = 𝑋𝑜𝑑𝑗
′ 𝛽 − 𝛽𝑗
1
√𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑜𝑓𝑜 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗 + 𝜉𝑜𝑑𝑗 
where 𝑋𝑜𝑑𝑗  is a vector of observable characteristics of the origin airport, 
destination and airline. The term 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗  is the frequency with which airline 𝑗 
flies from origin airport 𝑜 to destination airport 𝑜 and 1 √𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗⁄  denotes the 
flight accessibility of an airline 𝑗. The parameter 𝛽𝑗 captures the preference 
for the flight accessibility. Given that the flight accessibility is inversely 
proportional to the frequency of an airline in an origin-destination, we expect a 
positive estimate for 𝛽𝑗 . 7  The airport capacity, 𝑓𝑎  is the sum of flight 
frequencies of all airlines operating at the airport, i.e., 𝑓𝑜 = ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑑 . 𝑝𝑜
𝑐 is 
the price of commercial goods at the origin airport 𝑜 and 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗 is the ticket 
price of airline 𝑗.  
 Finally, 𝜉𝑜𝑑𝑗 is the error term capturing airport, destination and airline 
characteristics which are unobservable to the econometrician such as the 
number of check-in desks at the origin airport, the number of baggage belts at 
the destination airport and departure time. Note that the 𝛽 's and 𝛼  are 
parameters to be estimated.  
Let 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗 be the market share of airline 𝑗 in the origin-destination 𝑜𝑑, 
𝑠𝑗|𝑜𝑑 be the market share of airline 𝑗 within the nest “travelling by an airline 
                                                 
7
 Richard (2003) interprets 1 √fodj⁄  as passenger’s cost of schedule delay, i.e., the difference between the 
passengers’ preferred departure time and the actual departure time. A passenger’s schedule delay is inversely 
proportional to the frequency, assuming that desired departure times are uniformly distributed and an airline groups 
some of its departure times. However, cost of delay refers to congestion in general at an airport. We measure this by the 
total number of flights at the airport, 𝑓𝑜. 
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from airport 𝑜 to destination 𝑑, and 𝑠0  be the market share of the outside 
option. Moreover, let us normalize the mean utility of the outside option to 0, 
i.e. 𝑉0 = 0. Following Berry (1994), the share of passengers using airline 𝑗 in a 
given origin destination 𝑜𝑑, 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗, is given by  
(4)  𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗 = 𝑒
𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑠0𝑠𝑗|𝑜𝑑
𝜎  
which leads to the following estimation equation:  
(5)  
ln 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗 − ln 𝑠0 = 𝑋𝑜𝑑𝑗
′ 𝛽 − 𝛽𝑗
1
√𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑎𝑓𝑜 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗
+ 𝜎 ln 𝑠𝑗|𝑜𝑑 + 𝜉𝑜𝑑𝑗 
The market shares are measured as:  
(6)  𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗 =
𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑀
 
 
(7)  𝑠𝑗𝑜𝑑 =
𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗
∑ 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝑜𝑑
 
where 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗 is the total number of passengers travelling from origin airport 𝑜 
to destination airport 𝑑 by airline 𝑗 and 𝑀 is the total market size.  
If airports are two-sided platforms, the airport should be able to affect 
the demand of passengers for the airlines through its pricing scheme. Thus, we 
expect 𝛽𝑐 in Equation 5 to be significantly different than zero. Moreover, in 
this two-sided platform the passenger’s benefit, hence their demand, should also 
depend on the total number of products (flights) they can access. So we also 
expect 𝛽𝑜 to be statistically significant.  
 
B. Airline Side 
 
Each airline 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝑜𝑑  sets its fare, 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗 , and frequency, 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗 , 
which maximizes its profit 𝜋𝑜𝑑𝑗  on each market. The profit maximization 
problem of airline 𝑗 is written as: 
(8)  
max
𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗,𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝜋𝑜𝑑𝑗 = (𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗 − 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑞 )𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗 − 𝑝𝑜
𝑎𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗 − 𝐹𝑜𝑑𝑗       
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝜋𝑎𝑑𝑗 ≥ 0 
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where 𝐹𝑜𝑑𝑗 is the airline 𝑗’s route specific fixed cost, 𝑝𝑜
𝑎 is the aeronautical 
fee charged by the origin airport 𝑜  per flight (departure) and 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑞
 is the 
marginal cost per passenger of airline 𝑗 for route 𝑜𝑑. Since we do not observe 
this marginal cost, we posit that  
(9)  𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑞 = 𝑍𝑜𝑑𝑗
′ 𝜆 + 𝑢𝑜𝑑𝑗 
where 𝑍𝑜𝑑𝑗
′  is a vector of cost shifters that includes airline, destination and 
origin airport specific variables, and 𝑢𝑜𝑑𝑗 is an error term. Then, the optimal 
levels of price and frequency obtained from equation (8) are given by:  
(10)  𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗
∗ = 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑞 +
1
𝛼 (
1
1 − 𝜎 −
𝜎
1 − 𝜎 𝑠𝑗|𝑜𝑑 − 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗)
 
 
(11)  𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗
∗ = [
2
𝛽𝑗
(𝛽𝑜 −
𝛼𝑝𝑜
𝑎
𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗
)]
−2/3
 
 Note that the price of product 𝑜𝑑𝑗 is equal to the marginal cost of 
product 𝑜𝑑𝑗 plus a mark-up term. The latter decreases in the substitutability 
among the products in a given origin-destination. Moreover, Equation (10) 
shows that higher market shares lead to higher prices This relation is in line with 
the finding of Borenstein (1989) that an airline with a dominant position at an 
airport can use its market power to charge higher prices. Equation (11) shows 
that the optimal level of frequency depends on the number of passengers and the 
aeronautical fee charged by the airport, as well as on the parameters, 𝛼, the 
marginal utility of income, 𝛽𝑗, the consumers’ valuation of waiting time, and 
𝛽𝑜, consumers’ valuation of total frequency at origin airport (in other words, the 
cost of congestion). Put it differently, the demand of airlines for the airport does 
not only depend on the aeronautical fee 𝑝𝑜
𝑎  but also on the number of 
passengers, 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗. In this case, as a two-sided platform, the airport can effect this 
demand either by changing the aeronautical fee which will affect the demand 
directly or by changing the commercial fee 𝑝𝑜
𝑐 which will affect the passenger 
demand 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗  and then the airline demand 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗  via the two-sided network 
effects.  
 
IV. Estimating Passenger and Airline Behavior 
 
In this section we specify the model according to the data set and explain 
the estimation method. Then, we present the estimation results of the passenger 
demand Equation (5) and the airline pricing Equation (10).  
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A. Model Specification 
 
The econometric model includes three groups of explanatory variables: 
origin airport characteristics, market characteristics and product/airline 
characteristics.  
The origin airport characteristics we include are the total flight 
frequency at the airport, the distance to the closest business district, the average 
shopping area and the daily parking fee. The daily parking fee, which can be 
considered as an access fee to the airport, is used as a proxy for commercial 
(non-aeronautical) fees charged by the airport to passengers. Since our data set 
only contains direct flights, each passenger using the origin airport has to bear a 
transport cost. So the parking fee captures this transport cost guaranteeing our 
assumption that each passenger consumes a positive amount of commercial 
good. The observed market characteristics are population and median per capita 
personal income at the origin and destination metropolitan areas as well as the 
distance between the origin and destination airports (in terms of miles flown). 
Regarding product/airline characteristics we consider price, number of 
passengers, flight frequency, number of destinations (the number of 
destinations operated from origin airport by an airline) and the total distance 
flown from origin airport by each airline.  
The factors affecting the passenger demand are then the following: 
ticket fare, average shopping area, number of destinations, population at 
destination, consumer’s cost of schedule delay, total flight frequency at the 
airport, distance, distance squared, daily parking fee, distance to the closest 
business district, total distance flown from origin by each airline, and airline 
dummies.
8
 As well as the common origin airport specific variables like distance 
to the closest business district and total flight frequency, we include average 
shopping area in the passenger demand equation in the interest of showing 
whether passengers gain from the presence of large shopping areas at an airport.  
When considering the daily parking fee in the estimation process, we 
multiply it with a destination specific coefficient which is the weight of 
destination in terms of passenger traffic at the origin airport in the previous 
period (i.e., the second quarter of the year 2006) to capture the heterogeneity of 
destinations in commercial revenue generation.  
We have both distance and distance squared variables to capture the 
shape of demand. In general, air travel demand is U-shaped in distance. 
Whence, passenger demand for air transport initially grows with distance 
because of the decrease in substitution between air and other modes of 
transportation (e.g., trains and cars), then decreases as the distance increases 
further since the trip becomes less pleasant. Air travel demand initially grows 
with distance since the competition with other modes of transportation 
                                                 
8
 We include American Airlines (baseline dummy), JetBlue Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, 
Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, Southwest Airlines and a dummy for the rest. 
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decreases. There is inter-modal competition between airlines and other modes 
of transportation (e.g. trains, cars) at a short distance. (See Ivaldi and Vibes, 
2008.) Berry and Jia (2010) find that demand starts to decrease as distance 
increases further and conclude that travel becomes less pleasant. Similarly 
Bilotkach et al. (2010) show also that flight frequency decreases after a certain 
distance since the competition from other modes of transportation decreases.   
As mentioned in Section 3, the consumer’s cost of schedule delay is the 
value of the time difference between the consumer’s desired departure time and 
the closest scheduled departure time of an airline. This difference is specified as 
inversely proportional to the airline’s flight frequency on a given market 
(origin-destination). (See Richard, 2003.) 
Moreover, we include two network measures for airlines in the 
passenger demand equation: The number of destinations and total distance 
flown from the origin airport by an airline. The former is the number of 
destinations from the origin airport operated by an airline and the latter is the 
logarithm of the sum of distances of all destinations from the origin airport 
provided by an airline. We also look at the interaction effect of these two 
network variables.  
In Equation (5) the marginal utility of income, 𝛼, is assumed to vary 
across origin cities. More precisely, as in Foncel and Ivaldi (2005), it is a 
function of the income at the city where the origin airport located
9
:  
(12)  𝛼 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑜 
where 𝛼0 and 𝛼1 are parameters to be estimated. This specification allows us 
to capture the wealth effect. Assuming that income is a proxy for wealth, we 
expect 𝛼1 to be negative and 𝛼0 to be positive. Then, the overall effect should 
be positive.  
The marginal cost defined by Equation (9), which enters the optimal 
price equation of each airline (Equation 10) contains distance, distance squared, 
number of passengers, flight frequency, number of destinations, an 
origin-destination hub dummy which is equal to one if either the origin or the 
destination airport is a hub for the airline, carrier dummies and airport 
dummies.
10
 The reason we include both distance and distance squared in the 
marginal cost equation is that the sign and size of the coefficients of distance 
and distance squared suggest the pattern of marginal cost. Moreover, the 
number of passengers, 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗, and the flight frequency, 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗, are introduced to 
identify their impact on marginal cost separately.  
The airline demand (Equation 11) links the optimal frequency to the 
equilibrium number of passengers, up to a stochastic disturbance term which 
represents measurement errors. We have tried to estimate the system of these 
three equations (5, 10 and 11) together, but faced some difficulties due to data 
                                                 
9
 Median per capita personal income is used for income. 
10
 We include airport dummies for MSP (baseline dummy), ATL, JFK, SFO, ORD and a dummy for the rest of the 
airports (BWI, IAD, IAH and SLC). 
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availability. Particularly, carriers use different types of aircraft on a given origin 
destination, therefore we need information on the type of aircraft used and the 
flight schedule in order to model carriers’ choices of flight frequencies together 
with pricing decisions.
11
 Given that we do not have such detailed data, the 
flight frequency is not estimated but treated as endogenous and is instrumented 
in our econometric model.  
In the model demand, price and frequency are determined 
simultaneously. As a result, in the passenger demand (Equation 5), price (i.e., 
ticket fare) and frequencies (i.e., an airline’s flight frequency and total flight 
frequency at the airport) are endogenous. Likewise, there are two endogenous 
variables in the marginal cost equation (Equation 9): number of passengers and 
flight frequency. 
 
B. Instruments 
 
The econometric problem that we face is the endogeneity of market 
shares, prices and frequency. The classical solution to this problem is to 
estimate two equations jointly by using instruments which are orthogonal to the 
unobservables in both equations. So, we estimate the system of equations 
simultaneously using Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen, 1982). For 
each equation, we define instruments which satisfy the moment conditions 
(13)  𝐸 [
𝜉|𝑊𝑞
𝑢|𝑊𝑝
] = 0 
where 𝑊𝑞 is the vector of instruments for the demand equation and 𝑊𝑝 is the 
vector of instruments for the pricing equation. Since the number of exogenous 
variables of our system is not enough to instrument all endogenous variables, 
we construct some additional instruments.  
On the passenger demand side, we construct five instruments: 1) the 
number of other airlines operating in the same market (i.e., the number of rival 
airlines); 2) the average number of passengers carried by rivals in the same 
market; 3) the average flight frequency of rivals in the same market; 4) a 
dummy indicating whether the origin airport is a hub for the airline; 5) a dummy 
indicating whether the destination airport is a hub for the airline. The number of 
other airlines operating in the same market (origin-destination) affects the level 
of competition in the market; hence it seems natural to use the number of 
competitors to instrument price (ticket fare). (See Berry et al., 1995.) In the 
sample, the average number of passengers carried by rivals predicts the market 
shares and the frequency very well. In practice, the average flight frequency of 
rivals on the same market predicts the flight frequency of a carrier, so it turns 
out to be a good instrument for the frequency.
12
 We believe that using a hub has 
                                                 
11
 A similar type of problem is also encountered by Berry and Jia (2010). 
12
 We assume that in our model the demand side shocks specific to an airline are not correlated with the other 
airlines’ characteristics. Hence, the average flight frequency of the rivals will be correlated with the frequency of airline 
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an effect on airlines’ cost and reflects the strategy of airlines hence the two 
dummy variables indicating whether the origin airport is a hub for the airline 
and whether the destination airport is a hub are good instruments for price and 
frequency. Besides these five instruments, we use airport dummies and 
nonlinear transformations of some instruments.  
On the cost side, we built two instruments: 1) the average number of 
passengers carried by rivals on the same market; 2) the average flight frequency 
of rivals on the same market. We assume that the average number of passengers 
carried by the rivals on the same market can predict 𝑞𝑎𝑑𝑗 in the cost function, 
but it will be independent of the unobserved cost shocks of the particular airline. 
Using the same type of argument, we assume that the average frequency of the 
other airlines is correlated with the frequency of the given airline because they 
share the same market characteristics, however it will be uncorrelated with the 
unobserved cost shocks of that particular airline.
13
  
As mentioned above, the exogenous variables that directly enter the 
passenger demand Equation (5) and the marginal cost Equation (9) are also used 
as instruments for the equations. As a result, there are more moment conditions 
than parameters to estimate in our system. We therefore test for the 
over-identifying restrictions. 
 
 C. Estimation Results 
 
The parameters estimated from the passenger demand and airline 
pricing equations are presented first. Then, we discuss the estimated marginal 
cost and margin of airlines. Table 5 presents the parameter estimates for the 
two-equation system. In the upper panel, we report the parameters of the 
passenger demand equation and in the lower panel, the parameters of the 
marginal cost equation are shown. We also report the Hansen J-test of 
over-identifying restrictions. It does not reject the joint null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term.  
 
Demand Parameters 
As discussed in Section 4.1, passenger demand is affected by ticket fare, 
average shopping area, number of destinations, population at destination, 
consumer’s cost of schedule delay, total flight frequency at airport, distance, 
distance squared, daily parking fee, distance to closest business district, total 
distance flown from origin by each airline, and airline dummies. All the 
estimated parameters have the expected signs and most of them are significant.  
To begin with, the price coefficient, 𝛼, is positive hence the effect of 
price on passenger demand is always negative at each airport. In other words, 
any increase in ticket fare leads to a decrease in passenger demand. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                
j since they share the same market characteristics such as the aeronautical fee of the origin airport, however it will be 
independent of the demand shock specific to the airline j. 
13 A same type of identification strategy is also used in Kaiser and Wright (2006). 
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𝛼 is assumed to vary across origin airports. (See Equation 12.) By specifying 
the price coefficient as in Equation (12), we introduce origin airport dependent 
effects of price on passenger demand. As expected, 𝛼1  is estimated to be 
negative and significant. Thus, passengers flying from an airport located at a 
richer origin are expected to be less sensitive to ticket fare.  
In a nested logit model, the coefficient 𝜎 measures the within group 
substitutability. The within group products are perfect substitutes when 𝜎 is 
equal to one. Note that, 𝜎 is estimated to be 0.55, we can conclude that the 
airlines flying to the same destination from a given origin are substitutable. 
Moreover, the estimated value is large enough to ensure that the nested logit 
model is informative. In other words, there exists a moderate correlation among 
products provided in the same market (origin-destination).  
As explained in Section 4.1, air travel demand is expected to be 
U-shaped in distance. However, the estimated parameters for distance and 
distance squared variables in our model do not show a U-shaped behavior. 
While the estimated coefficient of distance is positive and significant, the 
coefficient of the squared distance is not significant. Hence, we can only say 
that passenger demand for air transport increases with distance.  
Note that the frequency and the network size variables are also included 
in the demand function. The effect of the airline network on the passenger 
demand equation is in two directions. Passenger demand grows if an airline 
increases its number of destinations. That is, the more destinations an airline 
offers from the origin airport (platform), the larger the passenger demand will 
be. However, the passenger demand decreases with the total distance flown by 
an airline. We also look at the interaction effect of two network variables and 
find out that it is negative and significant. Thus we can conclude that passengers 
prefer airlines to operate many destinations rather than to operate longer 
destinations.  
Concerning the platform specific (i.e., origin airport specific) variables, 
discussed in Section 3.1, they are all statistically significant. First, the average 
shopping area is estimated to be positive, showing that passengers gain benefit 
from the presence of large shopping area at an airport. Second, we find that 
passenger demand decreases with the distance between the airport and the 
closest business district. Third, the coefficient on total flight frequency at 
airport, 𝛽𝑎 , is found to be negative, which captures congestion at airport. 
Accordingly, passengers do not prefer to fly from a congested airport. It can be 
claimed that passengers do care about the platform (origin airport) properties 
when they make their travel decisions.  
As discussed in Section 4.1, daily parking fee is considered to be the 
price of non-aeronautical (or commercial) services paid by each passenger to 
have access to the airport (i.e., join platform). The coefficient of daily parking 
fee, 𝛽𝑐, is found to be negative and significant so passengers fly more if the 
price of the representative commercial product goes down. That is to say, the 
airport can affect the transaction between airlines and passengers by changing 
its pricing structure. This result is in line with the two-sidedness definition of 
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Rochet and Tirole (2003). They state that the volume of transactions changes 
due to the network externalities if the price structure (relative prices between 
two end users) changes. The passenger demand in our model exhibits the cross 
relationship between the two end users, passengers and airlines.  
The two variables, namely the airline frequency, 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗 , and the total 
frequency at the airport, 𝑓𝑜, capture the two-sided network externality in the 
passenger demand. Note that, we specify the flight accessibility of airline 𝑗 on 
a given market as inversely proportional to an airline’s flight frequency on a 
given market and the coefficient 𝛽𝑗  enters the model with a negative sign. 
Table 5, on the one hand, shows that the coefficient on the cost of schedule 
delay, 𝛽𝑗, is positive and significant. Passenger demand decreases if the flight 
accessibility increases. In other words, the passengers prefer to fly with a carrier 
with more frequent departures because it means that they could catch a flight as 
close as possible to their desired departure time. This is the positive network 
externality between passengers and airlines. On the other hand, we have 
mentioned that the coefficient on total flight frequency, 𝛽𝑜 , is negative. 
Although the passengers benefit from an increase in the frequency of the airline 
that they choose, an increase in total frequency has a negative effect which 
captures congestion at the airport. Hence, there is also a negative externality 
between the two end users. Airports can affect airline demand, 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗 , by 
changing the price of departures. This change will be reflected in passenger 
demand through 𝛽𝑗  and 𝛽𝑜  which will have a further impact on airline 
demand for aeronautical services via Equation 11.  
As a result, airports satisfy the two main features of two-sided markets: 
the existence of network externalities between the two sides and the 
internalization of these externalities during pricing decision. Thus, one can 
conclude that airports are two-sided platforms which connect passengers and 
airlines in a way that they cannot interact without the platform and that the 
airports recognize the interdependency of the two demands. Moreover, airports 
can choose a pricing scheme for both sides by internalizing these indirect 
network externalities to maximize their profits. So an airport can exploit the 
externalities between the two sides, i.e., the more the two sides benefit by 
interacting with each other the more the airport can exploit these interdependent 
benefits to increase its profits.  
 
Cost Parameters 
We specify the marginal cost Equation (9), which enters the optimal 
price equation of each airline (10), as a function of distance, distance squared, 
number of passengers, flight frequency, number of destinations, an 
origin-destination hub dummy, carrier dummies and airport dummies. Most of 
the estimated parameters have an expected sign and are significant.  
For the marginal cost parameter estimates, there are a couple of points 
worth noting. The coefficients on number of passengers, 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗 , and flight 
frequency, 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗 ,capture the long-run effects. The coefficient on 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗  is 
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estimated to be negative, which means the marginal cost of an airline decreases 
in 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗. Precisely, by increasing the number of passengers, carriers can increase 
the load factor, thus spread out costs with more passengers. The sign of the 
coefficient on 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗 is positive as expected. The positive sign implies that an 
increase in flight frequency leads to a rise in the marginal cost of airlines. An 
extra flight in a market would increase marginal cost since the airline may fly 
with less full aircraft so costs are higher. However, we cannot fully support this 
conclusion since the coefficient is insignificant.  
Regarding the other variables, we find that marginal cost is increasing in 
distance, a long route may imply more fuel consumption. Moreover, the 
coefficient on the dummy indicating whether the origin or destination is a hub is 
estimated to be positive and significant. Note that we are only considering direct 
flights in this study. It is true that hub utilization decreases the cost of airlines in 
connecting flights but it is not valid for the direct flights. Finally, the 
coefficients on the airport dummies are broadly consistent with the reports on 
the landing and take-off charges of airports. For example, the estimated 
coefficient for JFK is positive, which charges the highest landing/departure fee 
among airports.  
 
Marginal Cost and Margins of Airlines 
More than 87% of marginal costs of airlines are estimated to be positive, 
which is a sign of the robustness of our estimated model. The estimated 
marginal cost and the margin of a representative airline at the airport level are 
presented in Table 6. The marginal cost is on average $52 while the margin is 
around 44%, which is quite close to the one found in the previous literature. 
Note that JFK and SFO charge the highest aeronautical fee among our sample, 
as expected the products originated from JFK and SFO airports have the highest 
marginal cost.
14
 Table 7 presents the estimated marginal cost and margins of 
different airlines. The low cost carriers have lower marginal costs and larger 
margins than the rest of the airlines.  
To sum up, our estimation results provide empirical evidence of 
two-sidedness in airport business models. One aspect is that passengers do care 
about airport facilities such as the average shopping area and airports are able to 
choose a price structure and not only a price level for their services. Another 
aspect is that both the flight frequency of the airline and the total frequency at 
the airport are significant in passenger demand. If an airline raises its frequency 
on a given route, it results in an increase in passenger demand through 
decreasing waiting cost. In addition to this, an increase in total frequency at an 
airport would reduce passenger demand via congestion effects. Consequently, a 
change in aeronautical fees would not only lead to a change in airlines’ demand 
                                                 
14
 As can be seen in Table 11, the aeronautical fee of JFK and San Francisco airport is much higher than that of other 
airports. We constructed the aeronautical fee as, 𝑝𝑜
𝑎 = landing revenues/no. of departures, however in reality the landing 
fees are composed of a fixed fee and a per 1000 lbs. variable fee. Since JFK and SFO receive more international flights 
than the other airports in our sample (33% and 14 % respectively) and the international flights are done by larger 
aircrafts, this makes the approximated fee per landing higher in these airports.  
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but also to passenger demand. Similarly, a change in concession fees would 
affect passengers and then airlines through network effects. 
 
V. Identifying Airport Pricing 
 
A. Theoretical Equations 
 
We consider a multi-product monopoly airport which provides 
aeronautical services to airlines and commercial services to passengers. The 
airport decides on an aeronautical charge 𝑝𝑜
𝑎 and a concession price 𝑝𝑜
𝑐. In this 
section, we assess Pigouvian, profit-maximizing and Ramsey pricing under a 
two-sided market structure and a one-sided market structure.  
Pricing under a two-sided market structure implies that the airport 
considers the revenues or welfare from both sides when it is deciding on the 
price of one side. In other words, it internalizes the network externalities 
between the two sides. On the contrary, under a one-sided market structure, the 
airport considers revenues and/or welfare from each side separately. 
 
Pricing under a two-sided platform setting 
 
Pigouvian Pricing 
Pigouvian pricing requires that the marginal benefit of an activity equals 
the marginal cost of that activity. A Pigouvian airport (platform) maximizes 
total social value which is equal to the sum of benefits of users on the two sides 
of the market minus its costs.
15
 Thus, the problem of the airport is given by 
(Weyl, 2010)  
(14)  max𝑝𝑜𝑎,𝑝𝑜𝑐
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑑 + ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑎𝑑𝑗 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎𝑓𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐𝑞𝑐
𝑗𝑑𝑑
 
where 𝐶𝑆𝑑 is the consumer surplus on route 𝑜𝑑, 𝜋𝑜𝑑𝑗 is the profit of airline 𝑗 
on route 𝑜𝑑, 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 is the marginal cost of producing aeronautical services and 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 
is the marginal cost of producing commercial services. Moreover 𝑓𝑜 is the total 
number of flights from airport 𝑜 and 𝑞𝑐 is the total number of commercial 
good buyers. Roy’s identity gives 𝑞𝑐 = −
𝛽𝑐
𝛼
𝑞𝑜 where 𝑞𝑜 = ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑑  is the 
total number of passengers flying from airport 𝑜. 
Note that consumer surplus has two components: The first component 
comes from using air transport and the second comes from using commercial 
services at the airport. Given the demand specification in equation (5), the 
surplus of passenger 𝑖 from using air transport is given by:  
                                                 
15
 It should be noted that our results in the Simulation section depend on the components of our welfare function. 
Missing components due to the presence of other interest groups like green lobbyists that forces airports to limit landing 
capacities could change the outcomes of our simulations. 
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(15)  𝐶𝑆𝑎 =
1
𝛼
ln [1 + [ ∑ 𝑒
𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑗∈𝐽𝑜𝑑
]
1−𝜎
] 
and the surplus of passenger 𝑖 from using commercial services at the airport is:  
(16)  𝐶𝑆𝑐 = −
1
𝛽𝑐
ln [1 + [ ∑ 𝑒
𝑉𝑜𝑑𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑗∈𝐽𝑜𝑑
]
1−𝜎
] 
From the solution of the optimization problem in Equation (14), it is 
clear that the Pigouvian platform internalizes network externalities such that the 
social planner (airport) chooses the prices of its services on each side by 
considering the marginal benefit on both sides and the network externality 
between the two end users. Since the demand of passengers depends on 
frequency, a change in the aeronautical price, which affects frequency, also has 
an effect on the demand of the passengers. Similarly, a change in the price of 
commercial activities affects not only the demand of passengers but also that of 
airlines (frequency).  
 
Profit-maximizing Pricing 
We now consider a profit-maximizing monopoly airport. As a profit 
maximizing platform, the airport solves the following problem: 
(17)  max𝑝𝑜𝑎,𝑝𝑜𝑐
Πo = (𝑝𝑜
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎)𝑓𝑜 + (𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐)𝑞𝑐 − 𝐾𝑜 
where Πo is the profit of origin airport and 𝐾 is the fixed cost. The first order 
conditions lead to the price levels determined by a Lerner formula:  
(18)  
𝑝𝑜
𝑎 − [𝑐𝑜
𝑎 − (𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐)
𝜕𝑞𝑐 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑎⁄
𝜕𝑓𝑎 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑎⁄ ]
𝑝𝑜
𝑎 = −
1
𝜂𝑜
𝑎 
 
(19)  
𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − [𝑐𝑜
𝑐 − (𝑝𝑜
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎)
𝜕𝑓𝑎 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑐⁄
𝜕𝑞𝑐 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑐⁄ ]
𝑝𝑜
𝑐 = −
1
𝜂𝑜
𝑐  
where 𝜂𝑜
𝑎  is the price elasticity of airlines’ demand and 𝜂𝑜
𝑐  is the price 
elasticity of passengers’ demand at the origin airport 𝑜. Similar to Rochet and 
Tirole (2006), the marginal cost has been reduced by the cost of externality 
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generated by the other side compared to the standard Lerner formula in 
Equations (18) and (19). Since the airport considers the market under a 
two-sided structure, the airport’s profit per new user on one side pays a part of 
the cost per user on the other side of the platform. This term deducted from cost 
on the left hand side captures the effect of the number of passengers on 
frequency (number of flights on passenger demand) which may lead to prices 
below marginal cost. 
 
Ramsey Pricing 
In some cases the social welfare maximizing process may be infeasible 
in the sense that it may require a huge amount of subsidies. Ramsey pricing is a 
quasi-optimum or second best pricing scheme designed for a multiproduct 
monopolist airport since it reduces the deficit incurred in the operation of the 
airport. To get over this problem, the airport may choose to maximize the social 
welfare subject to the constraint that its profit is nonnegative. In other words, 
the idea of Ramsey pricing is to choose the price to maximize social welfare, i.e. 
consumer surplus and airlines’ profit, subject to meeting a revenue requirement 
for the airport. The problem of the airport is given by  
(20)  max𝑝𝑜𝑎,𝑝𝑜𝑐
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑑 + ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑜𝑑𝑗 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎𝑓𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐𝑞𝑐
𝑗
      𝑠. 𝑡.   Πo ≥ 0
𝑑𝑑
 
A Lagrange multiplier, 𝜇 , is used to include the revenue constraint 
explicitly in the above objective. Note that when the constraint is not binding, 
then the Lagrange multiplier is zero and we obtain Pigouvian prices. Moreover, 
we get closer to profit maximizing prices when the targeted profit is higher. As 
pointed out by Weyl (2010), Ramsey prices are weighted averages of Pigouvian 
and profit maximizing prices.  
The solution to the problem in Equation (20) provides a pricing scheme 
which takes into account the externalities arising from the two-sidedness of the 
market. As in Oum and Tretheway (1988), our Ramsey pricing can be used to 
determine the quasi-optimal user charges for the airport and we extend the 
analysis to a two-sided market setting. 
  
Pricing under a separated platform setting 
 
The airport can also decide on the prices to be charged by considering 
each side separately. Under this scenario, the maximization problems of the 
airport are obtained as follows. 
 
Pigouvian Pricing 
A public airport which considers one-sided markets would choose 
prices by considering the surplus of the related sides. More precisely, it would 
choose a price for aeronautical services which equalizes its marginal cost to the 
marginal benefit of the airlines.  
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(21)  max𝑝𝑜𝑎
∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑜𝑑𝑗 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎𝑓𝑜
𝑗𝑑
 
 
(22)  max𝑝𝑜𝑐
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑑 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐𝑞𝑐
𝑑
 
The price for commercial services is chosen at the level where the 
marginal cost of providing the service is equal to its marginal benefits for 
passengers. In this case, the airport does not take into account the network 
externalities which exist between passengers and airlines and the prices may be 
below or above the socially optimal levels when the two-sided network 
externalities are taken into account.  
 
Profit-maximizing Pricing  
A profit maximizing airport, which considers one-sided markets, does 
not take into account the externalities exist between the airlines and passengers, 
and solves two separate maximization problem to choose its optimal price 
levels.  
(23)  max𝑝𝑜𝑎
Π𝑜
𝑎 = (𝑝𝑜
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎)𝑓𝑜 − 𝐾𝑜
𝑎 
 
(24)  max𝑝𝑜𝑐
Π𝑜
𝑐 = (𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐)𝑓𝑜 − 𝐾𝑜
𝑐 
where Π𝑜
𝑎  is the profit from aeronautical services, Π𝑜
𝑐  is the profit from 
commercial services, 𝐾𝑜
𝑎 is the fixed cost of providing aeronautical services 
and 𝐾𝑜
𝑐 is the fixed cost of providing commercial services. These maximization 
problems bring about the usual mark-ups which are equal to the inverse 
elasticity of demand on each side. The solutions to the maximization problems 
in Equation (23) and (24) are given by  
(25)  
𝑝𝑜
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎
𝑝𝑜
𝑎 = −
1
𝜂𝑜
𝑎 
 
(26)  
𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐
𝑝𝑜
𝑐 = −
1
𝜂𝑜
𝑐  
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Ramsey Pricing 
Under a Ramsey pricing scheme, the airport chooses the aeronautical 
fee which maximizes the social net benefits on the aeronautical side subject to 
the constraint that the profits on the same side are non-negative:  
(27)  max𝑝𝑜𝑎
∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑜𝑑𝑗 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎𝑓𝑜
𝑗
      𝑠. 𝑡.   Π𝑜
𝑎 ≥ 0
𝑑
 
The fee for commercial activities is given by the maximization of the net 
benefit from commercial activities subject to a non-negative profit constraint.  
(28)  max𝑝𝑜𝑐
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑑 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐𝑞𝑐      𝑠. 𝑡.   Π𝑜
𝑐 ≥ 0
𝑑
 
In the next section, we show what our data suggest about the pricing 
scheme of airports and we provide a test to identify the business model of 
airports by bootstrap methods. 
 
B. Simulations 
 
As explained in Section 5.1, we model an airport as a multi-product 
monopoly platform which provides aeronautical services to airlines and 
commercial services to passengers. The airport decides on the price of 
aeronautical services, 𝑝𝑜
𝑎 and the price of commercial goods, 𝑝𝑐. Moreover, 
we present the airport’s decision problem with different pricing schemes under 
a two-sided and one-sided market structure. If we model the demand side, i.e. 
the passenger and airline behaviors (Equations 5, 10 and 11) correctly, and 
given the parameter estimates in Table 5, the marginal costs of airports implied 
by the airport’s pricing problem should not be negative. In other words, the 
correct specification of the industry on both the demand and the supply side 
(airport) should result in a positive marginal cost. Hence, to identify the 
business models of airports we use the following strategy: We compute the 
marginal costs for aeronautical (𝑐𝑜
𝑎) and non-aeronautical (𝑐𝑜
𝑐) activities of 
each airport under different pricing scheme using our parameter estimates. We 
obtain a proxy for the aeronautical fee, 𝑝𝑜
𝑎, by dividing the landing revenues of 
the airports by the number of departures. As already mentioned, the daily 
parking fee is used as a proxy for the price of commercial goods, 𝑝𝑜
𝑐. Then, we 
check if the relevant constraints are satisfied with these estimated marginal 
costs (nonnegative profits for airports under profit maximizing and Ramsey 
pricing schemes). After controlling for these non-negative profit constraints, we 
run an adequacy test using bootstrap methods. More broadly, we perform 1000 
bootstrap replications of our original data set to obtain the standard errors of the 
marginal costs and the critical values for the t-test. The null hypothesis is that 
marginal cost associated to a particular pricing behavior is positive and 
significant. The results are presented in Tables 8-10.  
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Three main remarks can be made on these results. First, none of the 
pricing schemes under a two-sided market structure fits our model, i.e., the 
implied marginal costs are not both positive, see Table 10. We can conclude that 
the airports in our data set do not internalize the two-sided network externalities 
existing in the market when deciding on their prices. Second, we find statistical 
evidence of non-negative marginal costs obtained from separate maximization 
problems. Indeed the airports consider the market as one-sided, i.e. airports 
maximize their profits separately in each side without considering the 
interdependency between the two sides. Third, airports are using different 
pricing schemes for passengers and airlines. The results are presented in Table 8 
and Table 9.  
On one side of the market, we find that the marginal cost of commercial 
services obtained under profit maximization are statistically significantly 
greater than zero, hence we can say that the prices for commercial services are 
profit maximizing prices. On the other side of the market, the profit maximizing 
prices give a positive marginal cost and these marginal costs range from $28 for 
Atlanta Airport to $1312 for JFK. The result shows that the marginal costs of 
airports are varying widely among airports. Besides, we know that US airports 
are not allowed to freely set prices for aeronautical services because they are 
perceived as the natural monopolies. Almost all airports in the U.S. are 
government owned but effectively privately operated and even the private 
airports are subject to legal controls in the pricing of aeronautical services. 
Thus, we believe that the sample airports, which are all public, are 
implementing either Pigouvian or Ramsey pricing. While the Pigou prices do 
not satisfy the revenue constraints, the aeronautical marginal costs calculated 
under the Ramsey pricing scheme are statistically significantly greater than 
zero.  
As explained in Section 4, the Ramsey prices are calculated at different 
weights. Let us define the weight 𝜆 = 𝜇 (1 + 𝜇)⁄  where 𝜇 is the Lagrange 
multiplier of the constrained social welfare maximization problem in Equation 
(20). The weights airports are using in their Ramsey pricing schemes are given 
in Table (9). There are a few points worth noting. First, marginal costs are 
statistically significantly greater than zero for a weight 𝜆 = 0.5 for 7 out of 9 
airports. Similarly, Salt Lake City International (SLC) Airport’s marginal cost 
for the aeronautical side is found to be positive under a Ramsey pricing scheme 
with 𝜆 = 0.55. Finally, Atlanta International Airport (ATL) is known to be one 
of the most efficient airports, i.e. with the lowest cost. (See ATA, 2012.) We 
find that it puts the highest weight, 0.6 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 0.7, on the profit maximizing 
price. Since Atlanta airport has lower marginal costs, it has a higher ability to 
put more weight on profit maximizing prices. Thus, we conclude that Atlanta 
airport is implementing Ramsey prices on the aeronautical side although we are 
not able to obtain a unique weight without further information.  
In the US most airports are publicly owned, thus the airports have no 
incentive to set unfair prices. Although the Federal Aviation Administration is 
allowed to regulate the airports, no regulation has been needed. (See Gillen, 
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2011.) The airports’ business models as implied by our empirical model are in 
line with what the industry does in the real world. Thus, our tools can be used to 
evaluate the situation in other countries. In the regulation of private airports, the 
debate over single-till vs. dual till price-cap regulation is a hot issue. Although, 
there are some theoretical and empirical papers looking at this topic, such as 
Zhang and Zhang (2010), Czerny (2006) and Bilotkach et al. (2012), none of 
them considers the two-sided structure of the market. To draw reasonable 
conclusions on this topic the market as well as the actions of players should be 
defined correctly. When considered under a two-sided market structure, the 
conclusions obtained in these papers may not hold any more. In the next section 
we present a welfare simulation where we assume that the monopolist airport 
maximizes its profit under a two-sided market structure. We believe that the 
methodology and findings we present here will shed light on the pricing and 
regulation of airports.  
 
C. Airport Privatization 
 
In the previous section, we have concluded that the airports in our 
dataset are pricing passengers and airlines under a separated platform setting 
and they are using different pricing schemes for each side. While doing this we 
have also computed the marginal costs of airports. In this section, we simulate 
the model where the airport is a private monopolist who is maximizing its 
profits under a two-sided market setting. More precisely, given the parameters 
we have estimated as well as the implied marginal cost of airports we have 
computed, for each airport in our sample, we solve the system of simultaneous 
equations below for the optimal ticket prices for each airline on each route, 
𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗, the implied passenger demand, 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗 and the optimal airport prices, 𝑝𝑜
𝑎 
and 𝑝𝑜
𝑐, that is to say, we solve: 
(29)  
ln 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗 − ln 𝑠0 = 𝑋𝑜𝑑𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑗
1
√𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑜𝑓𝑜 + 𝛽
𝑐𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝛼𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗
+ 𝜎 ln 𝑠𝑗|𝑜𝑑 + 𝜉𝑜𝑑𝑗       𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝑜𝑑 
 
 
(30)  
𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗
∗ = 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑞 +
1
𝛼 (
1
1 − 𝜎 −
𝜎
1 − 𝜎 𝑠𝑗|𝑜𝑑 − 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑗)
  𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑗
= 1, … , 𝐽𝑜𝑑 
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(31)  
𝑝𝑜
𝑎 − [𝑐𝑜
𝑎 − (𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑐)
𝜕𝑞𝑐 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑎⁄
𝜕𝑓𝑜 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑎⁄ ]
𝑝𝑜
𝑎 = −
1
𝜂𝑜
𝑎 
 
(32)  
𝑝𝑜
𝑐 − [𝑐𝑜
𝑐 − (𝑝𝑜
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑜
𝑎)
𝜕𝑓𝑜 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑐⁄
𝜕𝑞𝑐 𝜕𝑝𝑜
𝑐⁄ ]
𝑝𝑜
𝑐 = −
1
𝜂𝑜
𝑐  
where the marginal cost per passenger of airlines, 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑞
, is replaced by Equation 
(9). Note that, Equations (29) and (30) are passenger demand and airline pricing 
equations which were derived in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Equations (31) and (32) 
give the first order condition of a monopoly airport under a two-sided market 
setting. As already mentioned, these conditions are different than the usual 
Lerner index since the airport is internalizing two-sided network effects.
16
 A 
priory, one would expect that the pricing of a private firm that internalizes these 
effects would be welfare enhancing. However our simulations show that this 
may not be true for some airports in our dataset. 
After obtaining these optimal values, we can compute the consumer 
surplus, profits of the airlines and the airports and the social welfare. Table 11 
displays these values under the current pricing regime while the results of the 
simulation are presented in Table 12. Our results show that the welfare effect of 
privatization of the airports is different for each airport. For example, for 
Atlanta airport, a private profit maximizing airport would lead to a social 
welfare increase of more than 200% while for Salt Lake City airport, this would 
result in a social welfare decrease of more than 50%. The effect of privatization 
on the number of total passengers using air transport is also airport dependent. 
The number of passengers originating from Atlanta, JFK and San Francisco 
would increase while for all other airports, this number would decrease. The 
mean ticket price the airlines charge would be higher at each airport although 
the aeronautical fee they would pay would not be higher at all airports. Flying 
from San Francisco airport would be cheaper under a private profit maximizing 
airport model whilst flying from Atlanta airport would be more expensive for 
the airlines. Finally, our most remarkable result is on the optimal price for 
commercial activities, 𝑝𝑜
𝑐 . Under the scenario of private profit maximizing 
airport, this price would increase drastically making it much more expensive for 
passengers to travel. Given the fact that the airports in our model are 
monopolists and that the we find that the passengers benefit from having more 
flights at the airports as well as using their services the private airport would 
                                                 
16
 Note that compared to the usual first order equations in a model of differentiated products under Bertrand 
competition, the marginal costs of each side of the market are “corrected” for the effect of the externality raised by the 
other side. Indeed the margin of each side is impacted by their marginal effect on the margin of the other side of the 
platform. For instance, if the passengers are exerting positive network effects on airlines, the margin on the passenger 
side will be adjusted downward.  
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exploit this benefit of passengers to increase its profits under a two-sided 
market pricing scheme. Though, note that, despite the increase in 𝑝𝑜
𝑐, at some 
airports, the total number of passengers travelling would still be higher.  
The simulation results for Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 
Airport (ATL) requires a specific comment. Note that, under the scenario of 
private profit maximizing airport under a two-sided market setting, the mean 
ticket price of airlines, the aeronautical fee and the price of commercial services 
are all higher for Atlanta airport. At the same time, the total volume of 
passengers choosing the air transport in Atlanta is also higher whilst the total 
consumer surplus is lower. Moreover, when we consider the social welfare, it 
would be more than 200% higher than the current state. To better understand the 
mechanism behind these results, we examine the ticket prices individually. 
Indeed, although the mean ticket price increases, for some of the routes it 
decreases which leads to large increases in demand resulting in higher total 
quantity of passengers choosing air transport in Atlanta. Table 12 shows the 
routes from Atlanta airport which would have lower ticket prices. For example, 
the Delta Airlines flight from Atlanta airport to Myrtle Beach International 
Airport would be $0.33 cheaper though with the increase in 𝑝𝑜
𝑐, the demand of 
passenger would decrease from 119 to 20. On the other hand, a $60 decrease in 
the price of Delta Airlines flight from Atlanta to Philadelphia International 
Airport even with the increase in 𝑝𝑜
𝑐, would result in 6282 more passengers 
travelling on this route. The main driver of these results is the high ticket price 
elasticity, the low airport price elasticities and the change in ticket prices. (See 
Table 13.) In the airports where we have an increase in social welfare in case of 
privatization, the average ticket prices increase less than the ones where we 
observe a social welfare decrease, except Baltimore airport.  
Our simulation results have important implications for policy analysis. 
First of all, as can be seen from Table 12, the effect of privatization on social 
welfare would be airport (origin) specific; for some airports it would be social 
welfare enhancing while for some other airports it would not. Secondly, such a 
case would lead the airports charge passenger much higher prices, which may 
necessitate regulation. Third, under the current situation of the industry, with a 
one-sided Ramsey pricing scheme, some airports, such as JFK or San Francisco 
set the aeronautical fee too high most probably as a result of not accounting for 
the two-sided network effects. Finally, it should be noted that we could not 
incorporate the fleet structure of airlines into our model. Hence in the 
simulations, we assume that the capacities of aircraft landing in the different 
airports are constant. Indeed one could imagine that the change of landing fees 
due to a change in the regulation could lead airlines to change their fleet 
structure. If an airline is able to adopt its fleet structure according to passenger 
demand, it can decrease its cost hence increase its profit. In such a case, the lost 
in social welfare stemming from the lost in consumer surplus may be offset or 
decreased by the gain in airlines’ profits. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses airport pricing under a two-sided market structure. 
In particular, we are able to show the interdependency between the two 
demands by identifying the network externalities between passengers and 
airlines and the ability of airports to set prices on each side of the market to 
affect demand. Using a data set from the US, we estimate the demand equation 
of passengers and the pricing equation of airlines. We also derive the pricing 
equations of airports under not only a two-sided market structure but also a 
one-sided market structure. Moreover, for each market structure we derive the 
mark-ups of the airports under three different pricing schemes: Pigouvian 
pricing, profit-maximizing pricing and Ramsey pricing. Using our estimation 
results we then compute the implied marginal costs for each pricing scenario. 
Finally, with the obtained marginal costs we performed a welfare simulation to 
see the effect of two-sided profit maximizing prices on the social welfare. 
We obtain four main results. First of all, we find evidence of 
two-sidedness in the industry (i.e. airports are two-sided platforms) and that 
there are network externalities between the passengers and the airlines. Second, 
our results imply that airports in the U.S. do not internalize the externalities 
between the two sides when choosing their prices. They instead adopt one-sided 
pricing schemes in which they do not consider the interdependency between the 
two demands. Third, airports use different pricing schemes for each side. We 
find evidence of profit-maximizing prices for passengers and Ramsey prices for 
airlines. Fourth, the effect of two-sided profit maximizing prices on the welfare 
would depend on the airport under consideration. For instance, for Atlanta, 
Baltimore, JFK and San Francisco airports, the two-sided pricing scheme would 
increase the welfare whereas for other airports in our sample it would decrease 
the social welfare.  
The main contribution of the paper is the empirical analysis of airports 
under a two-sided market structure which has not been done before. Moreover, 
to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to consider the business 
model of airports under two-sided market structure. Combining these two facts, 
we believe that the paper as a whole contributes to the literature on the 
regulation of airports since it presents the methodology to define the structure of 
the market and behavior of the players. More precisely, the fact that airports are 
two-sided platforms changes the relevant economic market definition for 
competition analysis of airports. Our results show that airports practice two 
separate pricing which show they are pricing under dual-till. Although the 
private airport has an incentive to take into account two-sidedness a priori, our 
simulation results show that it may not be welfare enhancing. In such a case it 
would be better to regulate the airport, i.e., we need to find a way to force the 
airport to increase welfare and it will only be possible by considering both 
services, aeronautical and non-aeronautical.  Thus we will need single till 
regulation. It is like global price cap which you regulate the access to and usage 
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of the network, where access would be the landing fees and usage would be the 
parking fees in the case of airports, see Laffont and Tirole (2000).  
The topic is very fruitful for future work. Our model can easily be 
extended to the case of competition between airports. Moreover, airports can 
also be examined for the optimal platform design, which in turn can increase 
profits by pricing the commercial services optimally. Besides all these, the 
debate of single-till versus dual-till can be reconsidered under the structure 
provided in this paper. 
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Appendix 
TABLE 1 AIRPORTS 
Airport Code City  State  No. Of 
Departures  
Revenue Passenger 
(million)  
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International  ATL  Atlanta  GA  467101  40.78   
Chicago O’Hare International ORD  Chicago  IL  441231  34.53   
George Bush Intercontinental  IAH  Houston  TX  281339  19.83   
Minneapolis-St.Paul International MSP  Minneapolis  MN  214283  17.13   
John F.Kennedy International JFK  New York  NY  147685  15.04   
San Francisco International SFO  San Francisco  CA  145234  13.91   
Salt Lake City International SLC  Salt Lake City  UT  156878  10.28   
Baltimore/Washington International  BWI  Baltimore  MD  120734  10.08   
Dulles International  IAD  Washington  DC  145262  9.72   
Top 31 Hub airports      511.13   
United States all airports     736.36   
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
 
 
TABLE 2 AIRLINES 
Airline  Code No. of 
  Products 
American Airlines AA  56 
Alaska Airlines  AS  1 
JetBlue Airways B6  14 
Continental Airlines CO  18 
Delta Airlines DL  70 
Frontier Airlines  F9  6 
AirTran Airways FL  47 
America West Airlines  HP  16 
Spirit Airlines  NK  3 
Northwest Airlines NW  31 
Sky West Airlines  SY  14 
United Airlines UA  72 
US Airways  US  6 
Southwest Airline WN  21 
Midwest Airlines  YX  2 
Total  377 
 
TABLE 3 REVENUE DECOMPOSITION OF AIRPORTS 
Airport  Aeronautical  Share  Non-aeronautical  Share  
 Revenue  
(million dollars)  
 Revenue  
(million dollars)  
 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International  53.17  0.25  158.02  0.75   
Chicago O’Hare International 340.26  0.69  155.23  0.31   
George Bush Intercontinental  230.73  0.74  81.74  0.26   
Minneapolis-St.Paul International 87.42  0.58  62.08  0.42   
John F.Kennedy International 553.78  0.78  155.79  0.22   
San Francisco International 259.01  0.65  141.18  0.35   
Salt Lake City International 41.70  0.51  39.80  0.49   
Baltimore/Washington International  69.66  0.58  50.77  0.42   
Dulles International  137.45  0.70  56.86  0.30   
Average Airport 197.02  0.60  100.16  0.40   
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TABLE 4 VARIABLE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max   
Ticket Fare, (in dollars), 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑗 97.85  46.46  3.73  259.24   
Number of Passenger, 𝑞𝑜𝑑𝑗 2174.31  1811.21  1  11975   
Number of Passenger on O-D, 𝑞𝑜𝑑 
 
5269.9  3587.56  16  19575   
Flight Frequency, 𝑓𝑜𝑑𝑗 401.81  273.88  9  1554   
Flight Frequency at Origin, 𝑓𝑜 71123.12  35183.83  30819  113417   
Daily Parking Fee (in dollars)  21.05  6.58  12  31   
Landing Fee (in dollars)  310.85  322.69  28.87  1312.19   
Average Shopping Area (in acres) 48.46  34.7  20.44  139.79   
Number of Destinations 19.72  16.44  1  43   
Population in Destination  4144403.42  3987904.35  27512  18825633   
Distance (in miles)  1135.02  691.71  215  4243   
Income in Origin (in dollars)  44162.94  6584.97  36210  59440   
Distance to Business District (in miles) 10.09  4.52 3  20   
Distance Squared  1765459.73  2154905.16  46225  18003049   
Parking Coefficient 76949.97  211838.84  21.85  1809871.8   
ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛) 9.38  1.25  5.69  10.78   
Population in Origin  5684085.9  4434666.74  585419  18825633   
Origin Destination Hub 0.71  0.46  0  1   
JetBlue Airways 0.037  0.19  0  1   
Continental Airlines 0.05  0.21  0  1   
Delta Airlines  0.19  0.39  0  1   
Northwest Airlines  0.08  0.28  0  1   
United Airlines 0.19  0.39  0  1   
US Airways 0.02  0.13  0  1   
Southwest Airlines 0.06  0.23  0  1   
Other airlines  0.14  0.35  0  1   
ATL  0.21  0.41  0  1   
JFK  0.08  0.27  0  1   
SFO  0.09  0.28  0  1   
ORD  0.23  0.42  0  1   
Other airports  0.28  0.45  0  1   
Note: Other airlines are Alaska Airlines, Frontier Airlines, AirTran Airways, America West Airlines, 
Spirit Airlines, Sky West Airlines and Midwest Airlines. Other airports are BWI, IAD, IAH and SLC. 
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TABLE 5 PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE TWO-EQUATION SYSTEM 
Demand Variables  Parameter  Estimate Std. Error   
Price  𝛼0 0.032
∗∗ 0.007   
Price*Income  𝛼1 −2.11 ∗ 10
−7∗ 
 
1.18 ∗ 10−7   
ln 𝑠𝑗|𝑜𝑑 𝜎 0.55∗∗ 0.21   
Flight Accesibility 𝛽𝑗 22.04∗∗ 4.25   
Total Flight Frequency at Origin  𝛽𝑜 −5.83 ∗ 10−6
∗
 3.32 ∗ 10−6   
Daily Parking Fee  𝛽𝑐 −1.07 ∗ 10−6
∗
  6.04 ∗ 10−9 
Constant  𝛽0 −2.19
∗∗ 0.79   
Average Shopping Area  𝛽1 
 
0.019∗∗ 0.002   
Number of Destinations  𝛽2 
 
0.23∗∗ 0.11   
Population at Destination  𝛽3 4.5 ∗ 10
−8∗ 6.55 ∗ 10−9   
Distance  𝛽4  0.0006
∗∗ 0.0001   
Distance Squared  𝛽5 7.08 ∗ 10
−8  6.5 ∗ 10−8 
Distance to Business District  𝛽6 −0.03
∗∗ 0.01   
ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛) 𝛽7 −0.2
∗ 0.106   
ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑛) ∗ (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 𝛽8 −0.02
∗∗ 0.009   
JetBlue Airways  𝛽9 −1.83
∗∗ 0.42   
Continental Airlines  𝛽10 -0.26 0.3   
Delta Airlines  𝛽11 -0.1 0.1   
Northwest Airlines  𝛽12 0.03 0.16   
United Airlines  𝛽13 0.28 0.17   
US Airways  𝛽14 0.06 0.28  
Southwest Airlines  𝛽15 −1.02
∗∗ 0.31   
Other airlines  𝛽16 −0.5
∗∗ 0.16   
Cost Variables  Parameter  Estimate Std. Error   
Constant  𝜆0 23.08 16.96   
Distance  𝜆1 0.005 0.008  
Origin Destination Hub  𝜆2  15.28
∗∗ 6.03  
Distance Squared  𝜆3 8.12 ∗ 10
−6∗∗  2 ∗ 10−6 
Number of Passengers  𝜆4  −0.011
∗∗ 0.04  
Flight Frequency  𝜆5 0.007 0.23   
Number of Destinations  𝜆6 -0.09 0.18  
JetBlue Airways  𝜆7 −62.41
∗∗ 12.66   
Continental Airlines  𝜆8 20.09 12.45  
Delta Airlines  𝜆9 6.04 6.17   
Northwest Airlines  𝜆10 3.25 6.63   
United Airlines  𝜆11  16.64
∗∗ 7.25   
Southwest Airlines  𝜆12  −28.88
∗∗ 8.39   
Other airlines  𝜆13  −26.44
∗∗ 5.86  
ATL  𝜆14 17.7
∗∗ 7.33  
JFK  𝜆15 24.61
∗ 12.69  
SFO  𝜆16  17.39
∗∗ 8.15  
ORD  𝜆17  12.68
∗ 7.67   
Other airports  𝜆18 8.46 7.36   
GMM Test Statistics   
Number of observation  377  Objective 0.0206   
Test  DF  Statistics P-value   
Hansen J (Over-identification  11  7.78 0.73   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 6 MARGINAL COST AND MARGIN OF AIRLINES (BY AIRPORT) 
Airport  Code Ticket Fare  
(dollars)  
Marginal Cost  
(dollars)  
Margin 
(%)   
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International  ATL  57.46  33.15  49.01   
Chicago O’Hare International ORD  71.93  46.69  43.98   
George Bush Intercontinental  IAH  85.26  58.99  39.55   
Minneapolis-St.Paul International MSP  58.43  33.02  54.22   
John F.Kennedy International JFK  98.53  73.34  36.23   
San Francisco International SFO  106.81  75.54  35.63   
Salt Lake City International SLC  81.59  58.25  37.01   
Baltimore/Washington International  BWI  60.22  34.52  50.11   
Dulles International  IAD  83.18  54.36  49.52   
Average   78.16  51.99  43.91   
 
 
TABLE 7 MARGINAL COST AND MARGIN OF AIRLINES (BY AIRLINE) 
Airline  Code Ticket Fare  
(dollars)  
Marginal Cost  
(dollars)  
Margin 
(%)   
American Airlines AA  79.39  53.76  39.56   
Alaska Airlines  AS  83.97  62.13  26.01   
JetBlue Airways B6  36.89  11.21  70.88   
Continental Airlines CO  83.63  54.11  47.39   
Delta Airlines DL  77.62  52.14  40.12   
Frontier Airlines  F9  50.01  27.48  47.81   
AirTran Airways FL  42.70  19.08  59.14   
America West Airlines  HP  77.47  54.11  38.33   
Spirit Airlines  NK  47.22  23.91  53.42   
Northwest Airlines NW  68.85  40.12  48.31   
Sky West Airlines  SY  32.41  8.77  75.12   
United Airlines UA  94.59  68.41  36.95   
US Airways  US  71.06  44.65  41.91   
Southwest Airline WN  50.77  23.03  62.35   
Midwest Airlines  YX  46.98  22.94  52.44   
 
 
TABLE 8 ADEQUACY TEST OF PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PRICING UNDER A ONE-SIDED SETTING 
Airports  𝑐𝑜
𝑎 
Std.  
Dev. 
𝑡0.05
∗  t  𝑐𝑜
𝑐 Std. Dev.  𝑡0.05
∗  t   
ATL  28.87** 0.003823 2.13104  7550.711  15.9842**  0.004623  0.787733  3457.365   
BWI  264.11** 0.002897 2.15538  91177.24  11.9994**  0.000528  0.421352  22705   
IAD 272.2** 0.009945 2.11786  27371.25  16.9997**  0.000261  0.449791  65186.7   
IAH  292.26** 0.001035 2.09882  282430  16.9999**  0.000103  0.409228  164680.5   
JFK  1312.19** 0.008882 2.11808  147738.3  17.9999**  0.00005  0.383185  347251.1   
MSP  186.91** 0.003631 2.13749  51482.66  17.9992**  0.000653  0.41453  27564.46   
ORD 352.87** 0.005712 2.05379  61776.14  30.9997**  0.000287  0.397127  108015.7   
SFO  483.99** 0.002939 2.14055  164684  19.9998**  0.000185  0.456119  108301.2   
SLC 74.45** 0.002903 2.08422  25647.83  27.9974**  0.001666  0.526749  16807.71   
Note: Profit constraint in profit maximizing pricing is satisfied in grey highlighted lines.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 9 ADEQUACY TEST OF RAMSEY PRICING FOR AERONAUTICAL SERVICES UNDER ONE-SIDED SETTING 
𝜆 = 0.5 𝜆 = 0.55 
Airports  Mean Std. Dev.  𝑡0.05
∗  t  Airports Mean Std. Dev. 𝑡0.05
∗  t 
ATL  43.822 87.3550  0.1861  0.5017  ATL 35.98 75.816 0.1803 0.4746 
BWI  89.384** 169.9740  0.2053  0.5259  BWI -63.24 178.85 0.4167 -0.3536 
IAD  120.582** 205.9850  0.2612  0.5854  IAD -165.01 252.632 0.5133 -0.6532 
IAH  51.661** 97.7480  0.2081  0.5285  IAH -846.74 388.462 0.6819 -2.1797 
JFK  128.999** 225.3140  0.2497  0.5725  JFK -1665.55 811.47 0.6990 -2.0525 
MSP  103.015** 193.7290  0.2156  0.5317  MSP -19.24 189.66 0.3335 -0.1014 
ORD  62.328** 119.6910  0.2064  0.5207  ORD -211.59 174.249 0.5530 -1.2143 
SFO  107.488** 162.7670  0.3211  0.6604  SFO -274.59 260.278 0.6453 -1.0550 
SLC  80.6790 166.9440  0.1829  0.4833  SLC 42.23** 150.631 0.2056 0.2804 
𝜆 = 0.6 𝜆 = 0.65 
Airports  Mean Std. Dev.  𝑡0.05
∗  t Airports Mean Std. Dev. 𝑡0.05
∗  t 
ATL  28.15 179.53  -0.0099  0.1568  ATL 20.31** 100.0100 0.1066 0.2031 
BWI  -215.86 936.61  0.0557  -0.2305  BWI -368.49 476.04 0.3424 -0.7741 
IAD  -450.6 474.75  0.3703  -0.9491 IAD -736.19 837.4 0.3611 -0.8791 
IAH  -1745.14 699.29  0.6126  -2.4956 IAH -2643.55 2231.11 0.3614 -1.1849 
JFK  -3460.1 1351.93  0.7529  -2.5594 JFK -5254.65 5105.34 0.3491 -1.0292 
MSP  -141.49 1332.45  0.0074  -0.1062 MSP -263.75 435.03 0.2911 -0.6063 
ORD  -485.5 482.89  0.2500  -1.0054  ORD -759.42 809.27 0.3340 -0.9384 
SFO  -656.67 11815.38  0.0610  -0.0556 SFO -1038.75 1158.35 0.3861 -0.8967 
SLC  3.77 355  0.0209  0.0106  SLC -34.68 218.75 0.1921 -0.1585 
𝜆 = 0.7     
Airports  Mean Std. Dev.  𝑡0.05
∗  t    
ATL  12.47** 160  0.0401  0.0779    
BWI  -521.11 864.18  0.2053  -0.6030    
IAD  -1021.79 1319.3  0.2729  -0.7745    
IAH  -3541.95 3360.44  0.3063  -1.0540   
JFK  -7049.19 7027.13  0.3231  -1.0031   
MSP  -386 896.7  0.1377  -0.4305    
ORD  -1033.33 1258.01  0.2540  -0.8214    
SFO  -1420.83 1719.77  0.3045  -0.8262   
SLC  -73.13 343.36  0.1193  -0.2130    
Note: Profit constraint in Ramsey pricing is satisfied in grey highlighted lines. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
TABLE 10 PRICING UNDER A TWO-SIDED SETTING 
       
 Pigouvian Profit Maximization 𝜆 = 0.1 𝜆 = 0.2 
Airports  𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 
ATL  -947.78  263995.3  189383.4  -55228.4  -879.71  232073  -811.64  200150.6   
BWI  7788.77  -4070728  -6272276  425900.1  6755.07  -3621066  5721.36  -3171403   
IAD  9945.27  -92273.8  -549527  43683.86  8187.36  -78678  6429.45  -65082.3   
IAH  13661.89  -271098  -3318812  270935.8  10983.4  -216895  8304.92  -162691   
JFK  22543.05  -15690.7  -779081  16129.43  18065.75  -12508.7  13588.46  -9326.64   
MSP  10801.46  -131215  -1020591  102661.8  8947.86  -107827  7094.26  -84439.4   
ORD  4345.14  -287290  -4405241  244986.6  3545.39  -234062  2745.63  -180835   
SFO  8062.14  -369902  -4997266  284813.5  6657.94  -304431  5253.74  -238959   
SLC  -1027302  1.81 ∗ 1010 1.24 ∗ 108 −2.2 ∗ 107 -924082  1.63 ∗ 1010 -820862  1.45 ∗ 1010 
 𝜆 = 0.3 𝜆 = 0.4 𝜆 = 0.5 𝜆 = 0.6 
Airports  𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 
ATL  -743.57  168228.2  -675.5  136305.8  -607.43  104383.5  -539.36  72461.09  
BWI  4687.66  -2721740  3653.95  -2272077  2620.24  -1822414  1586.54  -1372751  
IAD  4671.54  -51486.5  2913.63  -37890.7  1155.72  -24295  -602.19  -10699.2   
IAH  5626.43  -108488  2947.94  -54284.5 269.46  -81.12  -2409.03  54122.26  
JFK  9111.16  -6144.63  4633.86  -2962.63  1533.47  -14276.4  -320.13  9111.23  
MSP  5240.66  -61051.7  3387.06  -37664.1  156.56  219.38  -4320.74  3401.39  
ORD  1945.88  -127607  1146.12  -74379.4 346.36  -21151.7  -453.39  32075.96  
SFO  3849.55  -173488  2445.35  -108016  1041.16  -42544.4  -363.04  22927.19   
SLC  -717643  1.27 ∗ 1010 -614423  1.08 ∗ 1010 -511203  9.3 ∗ 109 -407983  7.22 ∗ 109   
 𝜆 = 0.7 𝜆 = 0.8 𝜆 = 0.9  
Airports  𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐 𝑐𝑜
𝑎 𝑐𝑜
𝑐   
ATL  -471.29  40538.71  -403.22  8616.34  -335.15  -23306    
BWI  552.83  -923088  -480.88  -473426  -1514.58  -23762.8    
IAD  -2360.1  2896.57  -4118.01  16492.33  -5875.92  30088.1    
IAH  -5087.52  108325.7  -7766  162529  -10444.5  216732.4    
JFK  -8798.03  6583.4  -13275.3  9765.41  -17752.6  12947.42    
MSP  -2173.73  32498.87  -4027.33  55886.52  -5880.93  79274.17    
ORD  -1253.15  85303.63  -2052.9  138531.3  -2852.66  191759    
SFO  -1767.24  88398.77  -3171.43  153870.3  -4575.63  219341.9    
SLC  -304763  5.41 ∗ 109 -201544  3.6 ∗ 109  -98323.9  1.79 ∗ 109    
 
 
TABLE 11 STATE OF THE INDUSTRY UNDER THE CURRENT PRICES 
 Passengers Airlines Airport 
Airports 𝒒𝒐 CS 𝒑𝒐𝒅𝒋 Profits 𝒑𝒐
𝒂 𝒑𝒐
𝒄  Profits 
ATL 0.1213 0.0068 57.15 2.1084 28.87 16 0.818 
ORD 0.136 0.010 69.47 1.967 352.86 31 30.679 
IAH 0.0180 0.0007 85.27 0.4592 292.26 17 14.989 
MSP 0.0450 0.0011 55.80 0.9394 186.91 18 4.3403 
JFK 0.0275 0.0001 72.63 -0.1451 1312 18 3.8150 
SFO 0.0541 0.0055 98.90 1.5301 483.99 20 13.218 
SLC 0.0288 0.1734 60.35 0.6606 74.45 28 1.2939 
BWI 0.0420 0.0302 41.91 0.8867 264 12 5.5713 
IAD 0.0187 0.0015 68.93 0.4328 272.20 17 5.1198 
Note: Total number of passengers (qo), total consumer surplus (CS) and total airline and 
airport profits are in millions. 
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TABLE 12 VALUES UNDER A PRIVATE PROFIT MAXIMIZING AIRPORT’S PRICES 
 Passengers Airlines Airport SW 
Airports 𝒒𝒐 CS 𝒑𝒐𝒅𝒋 Profits 𝒑𝒐
𝒂 𝒑𝒐
𝒄  Profits Change 
ATL 0.1296 0.0067 65.88 4.4516 201.16 623.28 19.623 217% 
ORD 0.1790 0.0096 70.28 4.2556 122.46 2.28 6.3491 -50% 
IAH 0.0040 0.0002 100.12 0.1287 430 8798 23.598 -12% 
MSP 0.0263 0.0007 69.88 0.8793 268 1108 8.5361 -1.4% 
JFK 0.1012 0.0001 74.80 4.5488 272.18 578.06 4.6172 109% 
SFO 0.0571 0.0062 108.96 2.6262 210 1272 3.6302 49% 
SLC 0.0069 0.1507 73.40 0.2024 157 2874 4.6380 -55% 
BWI 0.0417 0.0214 51.92 1.6705 207 1050 3.8126 47% 
IAD 0.0106 0.0011 82.23 0.3580 246.68 425.28 4.2580 -2.1% 
Note: i) Total number of passengers (𝑞𝑜), total consumer surplus (CS) and total airline and airport profits are in 
millions. Social Welfare (SW) is in percentage change. ii) The solution of equation system for Chicago (ORD) 
airport did not converge, we are reporting the results obtained after 35000 iterations. 
 
TABLE 13 TICKET PRICE ELASTICITY, AIRPORT PRICE ELASTICITY AND MEAN CHANGE IN 
TICKET PRICES 
Airports with SW increase Airports with SW decrease 
Airport 
Ticket 
price 
elasticity 
Airport 
price 
elasticity 
Change in 
mean 
ticket price 
Airport 
Ticket 
price 
elasticity 
Airport 
price 
elasticity 
Change in 
mean 
ticket price 
ATL 2.42 0.022 0.1527 IAD 2.42 0.054 0.193 
BWI 1.63 0.009 0.2388 IAH 3.44 0.007 0.1742 
JFK 2.87 0.039 0.0299 MSP 2.17 0.026 0.2523 
SFO 3.31 0.022 0.1017 SLC 2.55 0.019 0.2162 
 
